Recent weeks have sharply exposed the lack of direction inWashington’s policy on Syria by Gani, Jasmine
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2013/09/11/washington-lack-o f-direction-syria/
Recent weeks have sharply exposed the lack of direction in
Washington’s policy on Syria.
This week, a throwaway remark from the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, on placing Syria’s chemical
weapons under international control, has become a real policy proposal led by Russia. Jasmine Gani writes
that this ‘blunder ’ made good is symbolic of the Obama administration’s lack of strategic direction on Syria.
Only two weeks ago, Obama was pushing heavily for military intervention, but a vote against in the UK’s House
of Commons, increasing opposition in Congress, and the shadow of the Iraq war, have all undermined
Washington’s urgent push for action, and raised questions about US motives for any attack. 
In yet another dramatic twist in the Syria crisis, a seemingly throw-away remark by US Secretary of  State
John Kerry opened the door f or a non-military response to the deadly chemical attack of  21 August. Russia
and Syria, seizing on the comments, tabled a proposal to place Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles under
international control in an attempt to avert military action.  It may have simply been a delaying tactic, or an
attempt to embarrass the US by calling its bluf f ; but the suggestion has now been seriously considered by
the US, with Obama stating that this resolution would ‘absolutely’ take military action of f  the table. 
Although Obama downplayed Kerry’s remarks, revealing that he already discussed the matter with Russia at
the G20 summit last week, this was clearly a blunder f rom his Secretary of  State – but a convenient one
nevertheless that provides the US with a way out f rom a problematic commitment to military action.  This is
a marked change f rom the US posit ion just two weeks ago when military intervention was a question of
when, not if .  Several developments have altered the American calculus since then: increased public
opposition; the lack of  greater international support; and uncertainty within the US administration over its
strategic objectives.
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First, public opinion has not been on Obama’s side.  In contrast to their usual ambivalence to f oreign policy,
the majority of  the American public are strongly opposed to any military involvement.  According to a joint
poll by the Pew Research Centre and USA Today, 48% were opposed to military involvement last week;
since then, ironically amid intense lobbying f rom the US administration, this f igure has gone up to 63%. Iraq
and Af ghanistan have made the public war-weary and war-wary, and the scepticism has f iltered through to
their representatives in Congress.  The vote on military strikes by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations was close at 10-7 in f avour.  A vote in Congress, now expected to be postponed af ter recent
developments, is likely to be less f avourable: a poll on Friday indicated 230 of  the 433 members were
considering voting against Obama’s motion.  Even if  he were to win a slim majority, it would hardly warrant a
strong domestic mandate f or the crucial decision of  war; and if  he were to lose the vote it would be a
massive blow f or the US president’s authority and credibility, at home and abroad.  Such an outcome would
be polit ically disastrous f or the Obama administration and would have serious implications f or the rest of
his second term.
Second, lukewarm international support made apparent at the G20 summit has not just put the brakes on
US intervention but has af f ected collective US conf idence on whether it is in f act the right course of
action.  The US retains the hard power capacity to act unilaterally; but it is not the US’ way to rely on this
alone, its legit imacy –bruised in the past ten years – matters too.  Britain, normally the f irst to conf er that
legit imacy, delivered Obama an unexpected set-back with a parliamentary vote against intervention.  Though
Kerry was keen to minimise its signif icance in a statement the f ollowing day, undecided members of
congress have stated that it did have a bearing on their posit ion, generating doubt over intelligence that
evidently was not good enough f or their Brit ish allies.  Moreover, the rushed vote in the UK put pressure on
the US and France to similarly consult their respective assemblies, despite the f act that Obama and
Francois Hollande are not constitutionally bound by any such vote.  The UK ef f ectively slowed down the
momentum f or military intervention, allowing room f or deeper scrutiny of  US policy and with that growing
domestic scepticism.
The past two weeks have sharply exposed the lack of  direction in Washington’s policy in Syria.  Obama and
his government did not seem to know themselves what the def ining objectives of  military action were (or at
least how to sell them), nor how to proceed in the af termath.  Hence the constant dual messages in an
ef f ort to win over both hawks and sceptics of  war, at home and abroad. This has been ref lected by the
shif t ing emphasis in goals: init ially Obama and Kerry f ocused heavily on national security interests – the
credibility of  the US and its red lines, reassurance to its allies in the region namely Israel and Jordan, and a
warning to its enemies Iran and North Korea.  With his counterparts abroad wondering why they should go
to war to save f ace f or the US, Obama def tly ref ocused on humanitarian goals and international norms in
the run-up to the G20 summit: it was the international community’s credibility on the line, not the United
States’.  This did seem to make some headway; Russia cautiously accepted there might be a case f or
intervention if it  was proven the Syrian government was behind the chemical attack, and the UN hastened
the timetable f or the weapons inspectors’ report f or f ear of  appearing redundant.  But Obama’s rhetoric
also served to provoke questions over inconsistency towards the use of  chemical weapons – why was
action being urged now when other states, namely Iraq and Israel, had allegedly used chemical weapons in
the past with apparent impunity?  Coincidentally in recent days, declassif ied CIA f iles  have conf irmed that
the US aided Saddam Hussein’s use of  chemical weapons against Iran in 1988.Opponents to intervention
have highlighted this inconsistency, arguing that it undermines Obama’s calls f or urgency and raises
questions over US motives behind a military attack.
Beyond the mixed motives, there has also emerged a deeper ambiguity over the US’ intended strategy. 
Aiming his comments at the opponents of  intervention, Obama declared any military strikes would be
limited, merely to punish the Assad regime, not to remove it f rom power.  On the other hand, when probed
by interventionists at the Foreign Relations Committee, Kerry argued the strikes would indeed destabilise
the regime and might be the f irst step in Assad’s removal f rom power; in the debate he even brief ly opened
the door f or the deployment of  ground troops in the f uture, which he then swif t ly retracted.  The US
government were attempting to straddle both camps, while concerns about collateral damage, the dangers
of  striking chemical weapon f acilit ies, and of  regional consequences, were not adequately answered.  The
net result has been a highly unconvincing account of  strategic objectives and post- intervention planning;
thus the risks of  military involvement now look greater f or the US than they did two weeks ago.  For all of
Obama’s assertions that this will not be Iraq, its shadow and the f ear of  repeated mistakes loom large over
Washington’s f oreign policy decisions.
Given the above developments Russia’s proposal of f ers a t imely opportunity f or the US to back down f rom
a risk- laden intervention without having to entirely give up on Obama’s notorious red line drawn over a year
ago.  The removal of  Syria’s chemical weapons is a clearer and more limited goal f or the US to work
towards; crucially it can be pursued through the UN, avoiding some of  the controversies highlighted above. 
In this complex and costly polit ical game of  chess, it will now be the US’ turn to call Russia’s bluf f  by taking
its proposal to the UN Security Council.  It will seek to table a binding and timetabled resolution, crucially
tied to punitive measures if  Syria f ails to comply; if  it  succeeds, all eyes will be on the Russian veto.
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